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Securities Regulation:
Challenges in the Decades Ahead t
J. WILLIAM HICKS*
INTRODUCTION
The future of U.S.- securities regulation is tied inextricably to this country's
commitment to global economic competition. Traditional areas of concern,
such as the prevention and suppression of fraud -and the regulation of
securities markets, undoubtedly will take on new dimensions of complexity
as the world moves toward more integrated financial markets. This Article
will survey some of the important issues that loom as future challenges to
government regulators, investors, participants in the securities industry, and
courts. In Part I, three specific areas of concern are examined: the regulatory
framework for financial services, the standards of regulation, and enforcement.
How these issues are resolved will depend on the normative goals that
underlie U.S. securities laws. Two of these goals-efficiency and protection
of investors and securities markets-are likely to be at the core of future
solutions. However, these goals are inherently bipolar. For example, an
efficient system of regulation relies heavily on competition and free-market
forces, while the protection of investors and securities markets hinges on
legislative, administrative, judicial, and private restraints on free enterprise.
Obviously, harmonizing these two goals is difficult, even where the issues are
solely domestic. As international financial markets achieve greater integration
and particular legal issues take on both domestic and international dimensions,
this endeavor will become even more challenging.
Part II of this Article explores the theoretical side of securities regulation.
Part III uses one substantive legal issue-the scope of private rights of
action-to examine efficiency and protection of investors, two fundamental
goals of securities law, which have been, and are likely to remain, operative
in the resolution of particular legal issues, but which, because of the natural
tension between them, require careful balancing.
I.
U.S. securities regulation is a collaborative effort. Congress, which enacted
the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),' the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
t ©D Copyright 1993 by J. William Hicks. All rights reserved.
* C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a'to 77aa (1988).
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(1934 Act),' and the other statutes, which are often collectively referred to
as the "federal securities laws," responds to important developments in the
securities markets with legislation. The authority to administer and interpret
these federal statutes rests with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC or Commission), which directly regulates certain issuers of securities
and key persons associated with them-broker-dealers and investment
advisers-and certain organizations that perform critical roles in the trading
and settlement of securities.
Some of the industry organizations that are subject to SEC oversight are
partners with the Commission in the regulation of the securities industry.
Included within this category are the so-called self-regulatory organizations
(SROs), such as the eight active registered securities exchanges (for example,
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX)) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), each
of which adopts rules and imposes sanctions on its members. In addition,
important limitations on the offering and trading of securities become part of
the applicable law because of contributions by the Department of Justice,
which has exclusive authority to bring criminal prosecutions for securities law
violations; by administrative law judges and federal court judges, who
construe legislative and administrative pronouncements; and by members of
the legal and accounting professions, who as scholars, practitioners, and
advisers to government participate in the evolution of law.
State securities statutes in each of the fifty states provide a separate layer
of regulation. This body of law, as interpreted by state securities administra-
tors and state courts, is intended to supplement federal regulation. Since the
early 1980s, the North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) has cooperated with the SEC in developing uniform regulations for
both state and federal law.4
All of these participants in the formulation, interpretation, and implementa-
tion of securities laws can look forward to challenging issues that will arise
from the increased globalization of the securities markets and from dramatic
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 7811 (1988).
3. Federal securities laws are derived from six statutes: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a
to 77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78!!; Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1988); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to
77bbb (1988); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (1988); and Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (1988).
4. Under 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1), the SEC is authorized to develop greater federal and state
cooperation in securities matters. Furthermore, under 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(2), the SEC is directed to
cooperate in four specific areas: (1) maximum effectiveness of regulation, (2) maximum uniformity in
federal and state regulatory standards, (3) minimum interference with the business of capital formation,
and (4) a substantial reduction in costs and paperwork to diminish the burdens of raising investment
capital and to diminish the costs of the administration of the government programs involved.
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changes in the securities industry. Included among these challenges are issues
concerning the regulatory framework for financial services, standards of
regulation, and enforcement.
A. The Regulatory Framework
The present regulatory structure for securities firms, banks, and insurance
companies was created for the most part in the 1930s. Regulation proceeded
from the premise that the business activities of each component of the
financial services industry should be carefully circumscribed and that separate
federal or state agencies should be empowered to oversee and restrain each
part of the industry. The regulatory controls that Congress and the states
created were designed to remedy the abuses and excesses that occurred in the
years leading up to the 1929 crash of the stock markets and to help resurrect
the country from the ensuing economic depression. They were also intended
to restore investor confidence in the basic tenets of the free enterprise system
and in the nation's financial capital markets.
Within this grand design, the SEC has regulatory responsibility for broker-
dealer firms, investment companies, and investment advisers, but it has
virtually no authority over the activities of banks and insurance companies.
The Federal Reserve Board regulates bank holding companies. The Comptrol-
ler of the Currency is responsible for controlling national banks, while the
Federal Reserve Board and state authorities regulate state-chartered banks that
are members of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation shares supervisory duties with state agencies in regulating
nonmember banks that are federally insured. Savings and loan institutions
were regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation until 1989, when Congress abolished
those agencies and replaced them with the Office of Thrift Supervision.
State-chartered credit unions are regulated by state officials and federally
chartered credit unions are the responsibility of the National Credit Union
Administration. Two federal statutes, the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of
19336 and the Bank Holding Company Act,7 prohibit the combination of
commercial banking with investment banking and commercial activities with
banking. Insurance companies are regulated exclusively by the states. Under
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1462(a) (Supp. I 1990).
6. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377-378 (1988).
7. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),8 the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service share jurisdiction over
pension funds.9
Much has changed since the 1930s regarding the capital markets in the
financial services industry and in the regulatory environment. Investors can
choose from a wide assortment of investment vehicles that are traded in many
different markets. The money market offers a variety of short-term market
instruments, including negotiable certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances,
treasury bills, and commercial paper. The U.S. government securities market
consists of securities issued by the U.S. Treasury and all securities issued by
government-sponsored enterprises, such as the Federal National Mortgage
Association. The municipal securities market provides an outlet for debt
instruments issued by a state or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.
Corporate debt is sold and traded in the bond market. Markets also exist for
so-called derivative instruments such as futures, options, forward contracts,
and currency and interest-rate swaps. Some of these financial markets are
limited to professionals, but increasingly, more of these markets are becoming
available, directly or indirectly, to ordinary investors.
All investors have access to the traditional U.S. equity markets but the
nature of those markets has changed dramatically. Even as late as 1975,
American households dominated share holdings with seventy percent of the
total equities outstanding.'0 As of 1990, institutional investors, such as
pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and bank trust depart-
ments, held fifty-three percent of all equities." Along with the institutional-
ization of the markets has come an increased volume of trading activities by
broker-dealers, hedge funds, and other market professionals; a more
significant role for equity derivative products; the development of new trading
strategies, especially program trading in a variety of forms; and a growth in
foreign investment in U.S. equities.'
8. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242.
10. U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,012, at 82,907 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter Equity Market Structure
Study].
11. Id.
12. Between 1980 and 1990, the value of foreign trading in U.S. stocks grew from $75 billion
annually to approximately $417 billion, a 456% increase. Dep "ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Appropriations, Part 6, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 590 (1992) [hereinafter Appropriations for 1993].
During that same period, foreign purchases of U.S. debt securities increased from $122.9 billion to an
estimated $3.9 trillion, an increase of 3,073%. Reauthorizations for the Securities and Exchange
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The financial services industry has also undergone a transformation. During
the past twenty years, commercial and financial institutions have successfully
exploited soft spots in statutory restraints to broaden their product lines. This
expansion of financial services was aided by a political atmosphere that
championed deregulation, an economy that struggled through extended periods
of instability, and an era marked by revolutionary developments in computer
and communications technologies. By using holding companies with
independent subsidiary corporations as the vehicle for transgressing traditional
service boundaries:
insurance companies acquired mutual funds; mutual funds introduced
money market accounts, with check writing privileges; retailers acquired
securities brokers, thrifts and limited-service banks, also known as
"nonbank banks"; securities brokers invented cash management margin
accounts featuring check writing and credit card services; and credit card
companies acquired banks and securities brokers. 3
For their part, bank holding companies acquired discount brokers, insurance
companies, and mutual funds. The immediate future promises further
fragmentation of the banking industry and greater consolidation of financial
services.
It is against these developments that Congress and other regulators of
securities must assess the regulatory framework for the entire financial
services industry. What seems obvious is the need for reform. The absence of
a coherent federal policy on how best to regulate these crucial segments of the
economy does more than create uncertainty about the scope of jurisdiction
among the various state and federal regulators or raise questions about the
risks of liability for firms seeking innovative responses to the challenges of
competitors. It also fosters inefficiencies and inequities in capital markets both
here and abroad. For instance, despite the economic interdependence of equity
securities and equity index futures, equity securities and options relating to
them are regulated by the SEC, but futures and futures on stock indices are
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Predictably, some
"hybrid" instruments are not easy to categorize as either equity securities or
futures. Even where classification of an investment instrument is clear, the
regulatory impact for similar financial arrangements varies significantly.
Furthermore, purchasers of these securities encounter different regulation.
Commission, 1992-94: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1991) [hereinafter SEC Reauthorizations for
1992-94].
13. RiCHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 77 (7th
ed. 1992).
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Margin rules, which are administered by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, restrict borrowing for the purchase of equity
securities but they do not apply to futures.
1 4
The absence of coordinated regulation also complicates U.S. regulation in
globalized securities markets. For example, because of Glass-Steagall the U.S.
securities exchanges are closed to commercial banks. 5 But some U.S. banks
avoid these limitations by trading abroad.' 6 Although their activities are
beyond the reach of the SEC, these affiliates of U.S. banks engage in
transactions with U.S. investors in securities issued by U.S. companies. In
some countries, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, banks are the
primaiy, or the exclusive, securities traders. The chief purpose of stock
exchanges in these countries is to provide a convenient place for banks to
meet and conduct securities business.' 7 International linkages among markets
and the growth of twenty-four-hour trading have made it possible for foreign
banks in these countries to effect trading in U.S. securities by U.S. investors
in competition with domestic securities firms.
The solution to these and other inequities in the law seems clear. In order
for the United States to compete effectively in the global financial markets,
while also ensuring that U.S. securities markets remain vibrant, fair, and
economically efficient, the present regulatory framework must be reformed or
replaced. The political costs of this approach are sure to be enormous. At a
minimum, revamping the regulatory system will necessitate transfers of
authority and jurisdiction among some of the many participating federal
agencies."' More radical reform might involve the elimination of one or more
existing agencibs. 9 Reorganization is also likely to raise issues of federal
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1988).
15. Member banks of the Federal Reserve System are prohibited from dealing in securities. 12
U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 377.
16. See INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET: REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ch. V, at 3 (July 27, 1987) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS REPORT).
17. BRUNO SOLNIK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 106-07 (2d ed. 1991).
18. Consider, for example, the recent decision by the U.S. House of Representatives, which, by a
vote of 279 to 124, rejected S. 1699, a bill aimed at reforming the government securities markets after
revelations in 1991 about the activities of Salomon Brothers Inc. in the government securities auction
market. See 138 CONG. REC. H8623 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1992). House Banking Committee members
opposed adoption of the bill because it would have removed the authority of banking regulators over
government securities activities of insured depository institutions and instead would have given it to the
SEC. 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, 1479, 1479-80 (Sept. 18, 1992).
19. In a speech on the fifth anniversary of the October 19, 1987, market break, Chicago Mercantile
Exchange Chairman Jack Sandner recommended the creation of a single "super-agency" that would
regulate securities, futures, options, and derivative products and that would become an integral part of
the banking regulatory system. Chairman Sandner predicted that the proposed agency would be in place
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preemption of traditional areas of state regulation, such as corporations,
securities, insurance, and banking. Ultimately, however, Congress must
determine what role the SEC and SROs will play in the national and
international financial marketplaces.
B. Standards
The U.S. markets have served as a model for foreign markets by developing
new investment products and by promoting competition among market
professionals. They have also influenced the trend toward internationalization.
The liquidity and efficiency of the U.S. securities markets can be traced in
large part to the high quality of supervision and regulation that the SEC and
SROs provide over market professionals and other participants in the issuance
and trading of securities. But the rigorous standards that these regulators have
developed, typically the toughest in the world, are being challenged by
increasing competition *among the international securities markets. As the
standard bearer, the U.S. must be flexible in accommodating business
practices around the world and in harmonizing U.S. regulations with those of
other countries. The issue, of course, is how far Congress, the SEC, and the
SROs can go in modifying rules and regulations without jeopardizing fair
dealing and investor protection. Pressure to dilute existing standards, or to
prevent the enactment or adoption of stronger norms, will continue to come
from a variety of sources, including domestic participants in the securities
industry, such as stock exchanges as they seek new members and new listings
of securities;2" foreign firms seeking entry to U.S. markets; members of
multilateral institutions, such as the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO); and U.S. and foreign governmental officials. Even the
SEC can be expected to experience internal debate on whether it can achieve
its goal of removing barriers to access for U.S. securities and financial firms
in foreign markets without diluting some or all of its standards. An examina-
tion of some of the more important standards at issue reveals the complexity
and importance of this challenge.
within five to ten years. He argued that a new single agency was needed to improve the competitiveness
of domestic financial markets and to trim regulatory costs stemming from jurisdictional disputes among
the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and bank regulators on one level, and the
congressional committees overseeing these agencies on another. 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42,
1629, 1633 (Oct. 23, 1992).
20. For example, in an effort to offer direct listing of German stock on the NYSE, stock exchange
officials sought an SEC compromise on the Commission's accounting standards, which most German
companies do not satisfy. The SEC refused to compromise. Jonathan Fuerbringer, SEC Says No on
German Stocks, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1992, § 3, at 15.
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1. Full Disclosure
One of the essential missions of the SEC is to ensure that investors are
provided with material information and are protected from fraud and
misrepresentation in the public offering, trading, voting, and tendering of
securities. The Commission's authority for mandating full disclosure of
material facts in these instances is derived from the 1933 Act, which requires
issuers to. make disclosures concerning their business, financial affairs, and
intended use of proceeds when they distribute their securities publicly,2 and
from the 1934 Act, which requires issuers to file periodic reports with the
SEC and to make disclosures in proxy solicitations, tender offers, and
ownership reports.2" The staff of the SEC accomplishes this mission by
reviewing filings, responding to inquiries through interpretive releases and no-
action letters, and providing the public with access to the documents and
reports that are filed with the Commission.
Disclosure to U.S. investors in connection with securities offerings and
trading in foreign countries is markedly dissimilar. It depends on market
conditions at the time of a transaction or, in those jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue, on regulations that fall short of the disclosure guidelines
in the United States.23 The Commission's modest success in overcoming the
differences in disclosure requirements has been achieved by entering into
bilateral and multilateral agreements with foreign countries where the
disclosure systems are comparable.24
2. Accounting Principles
Differences in accounting and auditing standards represent a significant
hurdle to fully integrated international securities markets. In part, these
differences can be explained by the manner in which accounting principles are
established. In the United States, the SEC recognizes a private sector body,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as the group of profession-
als with authority to establish standards of financial accounting and reporting.
In developing accounting standards, the FASB employs a multi-step process
that resembles the rule-making procedures used by the SEC. With very few
21. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1988).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(a), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1988).
23. INTERNATIONAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 16, ch. III, at 40-43.
24. See, e.g., Multijurisdictional Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6841, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,432 (July 26, 1989) (providing for the facilitation of cross-border
offerings of securities by certain Canadian issuers).
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exceptions, the Commission has judged the determinations by the FASB as
being responsive to the needs of investors."
In other countries, such as Japan, where governmental bodies promulgate
accounting principles, tax regulations tend to influence the presentation of
financial information. The objectives of fiscal authorities do not usually
coincide with the needs of investors. Consequently, the obligation of
professionals in these countries to conform their accounting principles to tax
regulations frustrates the fair presentation of financial condition and operating
results.26 Although the SEC has been under pressure to relax its financial
disclosure standards, it continues to insist that foreign issuers comply with
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards.
3. Net Capital Requirements
Capital adequacy standards ensure that market intermediaries will have
sufficient resources to settle the securities transactions that they effect for
themselves and their customers and to safeguard the cash and the securities
that they hold for customers. Capital adequacy rules for securities firms
contribute to investor confidence in the securities markets. The SEC's
standards are set forth in rule 15c3-1 under the 1934 Act, which specifies
minimum levels of net capital that a registered broker-dealer must main-
tain.27 U.S. stock exchanges and the NASD also have rules that require
broker-dealers to maintain sufficient liquid assets to satisfy promptly the
claims of customers and broker-dealers. But the increased internationalization
of securities markets has created difficulties for the SEC and the SROs in
their efforts to ensure the financial integrity of multinational firms.
Neither the SEC nor the SROs has the authority to examine and regulate the
activities of unregistered overseas affiliates of U.S. registered broker-dealers.
Efforts by the SEC and regulators from other countries to develop minimum
net capital standards for all intermediaries have been complicated by at least
two problems. First, even if standards of broker-dealer solvency are
established for all securities firms, it is unlikely that they would apply to
banks, which in certain countries play the exclusive or major role in securities
transactions. Furthermore, because financial competence standards for banks
25. See Accounting Series Release No. 150, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder 1937-
1982] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,172 (Dec. 20, 1973). In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,374 (N.D. II. 1978), the court, holding that Arthur
Andersen & Co. did not have standing, noted that the Commission's deference to industry did not
represent unlawful delegation to a private body.
26. INTERNATIONAL MARKETs REPORT, supra note 16, ch. IV, at 1-8.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.153-1 (1992).
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involve policy considerations that differ from those that inhere in the capital
adequacy standards of securities firms, reconciliation of the standards will not
be easy. So long as separate capital adequacy standards exist for banks and
securities firms, one side is likely to enjoy a competitive advantage in the
international markets. Second, net capital requirements that are too demanding
can end up hurting investors. Exacting capital adequacy standards are clearly
desirable because of the added protection they offer against failures of
securities firms and the resulting harm to customers and, in the collapse of a
major firm, investors and markets throughout the world. But capital adequacy
standards that are too rigorous can also serve as a barrier to entry into
markets. Where this barrier exists, investors are denied the benefits of
competition from excluded securities firms that are otherwise financially
responsible.28
4. Transparency, Clearance, and Settlement
The U.S. markets in general have achieved a high level of transparency, that
is, the degree to which real-time trade and quote information is disseminated
to market participants.29 Purchasers and sellers have access to current market
information and are therefore in a better position to assess the market value
of securities, to evaluate the fairness of fees or brokerage charges that they
pay to intermediaries, and to assist regulators in controlling trading abuses
such as insider trading.
Most foreign markets lag behind the United States in the development of
effective trade and quote reporting mechanisms." And yet it is in these
markets where foreign broker-dealers are competing for order flow in many
U.S. securities and where domestic broker-dealers are finding lower costs,
both in terms of fees and regulation, in connection with trades that they
execute. U.S. investors who participate in these foreign markets run the risk
of relying on trade and quotation information that is stale and possibly
materially misleading. A pressing challenge, then, is to develop the means for
integrating widely differing foreign systems for the publication of transaction
reports.
28. See generally INTERNATIONAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 16, ch. V, at 37-49 (discussing
SEC efforts to regulate U.S. broker-dealers who deal with international affilliates and efforts to regulate
foreign broker-dealers' activities in the United States).
29. Equity Market Structure Study, supra note 10, at 82,919-82,920.
30. See generally INTERNATIONAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 16, ch. V (discussing regulation
of international trading and global securities markets).
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An equally serious problem is the lack of international clearance and
settlement links to facilitate cross-border settlements. 3, This causes delays
in transfers of securities and cash, subjecting the parties to higher costs and
greater risks of nonperformance, loss, and theft. Furthermore, the widely
varying clearance and settlement systems that exist among the world's
securities markets will hamper efforts to achieve greater uniformity.
5. Insider Trading
Under U.S. securities law, corporate insiders, particularly officers, directors,
and controlling shareholders, have an affirmative duty of disclosure when
dealing in securities.32 Where an insider,33 or under certain circumstances
a tippee of that person,34 fails to disclose material nonpublic information
before trading on it, he or she may be liable in damages to all the persons
who trade at the same time in the market. Insider trading liability can also
attach to persons who have no connection with the issuer but who purchase
or sell securities on the basis of material nonpublic "market information"
35
in breach of a fiduciary duty or a relationship of trust or confidence.36
Internationalized markets offer new opportunities to persons who, because of
their privileged position within the issuer, markets, or even government, or
because of their friendship or association with persons in privileged positions,
are able to realize secret profits in cross-border securities transactions.
Although the United States considers insider trading a threat to fair and
efficient securities markets, this view is not shared by all nations. The trend
within the international community is toward some form of insider trading
31. For an examination of the clearance and settlement system used in domestic markets, see Report
of the Bachmann Task Force on Clearance and Settlement Reform in the U.S. Securities Markets,
Exchange Act Release No. 30802, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,001 (June 22,
1992).
32. Insider trading violations are grounded on § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988),
and rule lOb-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1992); § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e),
and rule 14e-3 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1992); and § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78st-1, and § 21A
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a), both of which were added to the 1934 Act by the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
33. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971) (discussing rule lOb-5 liability). Section 20A of the 1934 Act provides an express cause
of action in favor of contemporaneous traders for violations of insider trading rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1.
34. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (articulating the conditions for tippee liability).
35. Market information relates to the supply and demand for a particular security.
36. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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prohibition, but definitions of such abuse vary considerably.3 7 Before the
SEC or other regulatory authorities can hope to develop a uniform standard
for international regulation, Congress or the SEC must first decide on a clear
definition of "insider trading" under U.S. securities laws. At present, neither
the federal statutes nor the Commission's rules define this crucial term and
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have addressed the issue do not resolve
ambiguities about either the scope or the underlying theory of this variety of
fraud. The uncertain parameters of insider trading under U.S. law are more
than an inconvenience. In addition to creating the risk of civil liability, a
violation of statutory provisions or SEC rules that prohibit insider trading can
result in a criminal conviction. Furthermore, insider trading liability is not
confined to persons who engage in domestic transactions. Judicial decisions
in the United States have extended the Commission's enforcement authority
to foreign securities transactions that have a significant connection with the
United States.38
C. Enforcement
In recent years, U.S. and foreign securities markets have grown dramatically
in size and sophistication. The need for strong deterrence against fraud and
other violations of U.S. securities laws is and will continue to be intense in
the highly charged atmosphere of round-the-clock trading that is sparked by
expanding global markets. Although responsibility for the prevention and
suppression of illegal securities activities is shared by SROs, the Department
of Justice, and private litigants and their attorneys, the SEC will most likely
continue to shoulder the heaviest enforcement load. An issue of critical
importance is whether the Commission will be capable of discharging its
statutory obligation of enforcement in view of the many complex issues that
will confront it.
One dimension of this issue is the magnitude of the enforcement problem.
The evidence suggests that, at least in the near future, the SEC will be faced
with significant annual increases in the volume of domestic and transnational
securities transactions; in the number of registrations by companies, broker-
dealers, investment advisers, and money-management funds investing
37. See generally 10 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITI s REGULATION § 1.08(5) (Clark Boardman Callaghan Securities Law Series, rev. ed. 1992).
38. Subject matter jurisdiction can be found under either the so-called "effect" test, e.g., SEC v.
Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990), or the "conduct" test, e.g., Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972). The SEC has estimated that
approximately 30% of the major trading cases in recent years had some international dimension.
Appropriations for 1993, supra note 12, at 683.
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substantial portions of their assets in foreign securities; in the complexity of
financial transactions and financial products utilized by issuers and profession-
als in the U.S. and foreign capital markets; and in the incidents of fraud and
other trading abuses.
39
Another aspect of the Commission's challenge is whether it will have
adequate resources to do its job properly. The SEC's enforcement program
evolves from intelligence analyses to investigations and ultimately to
administrative or civil proceedings. The first two stages of enforcement are
especially dependent upon sophisticated technology, skilled and experienced
personnel, and cooperative arrangements with other regulators. Consequently,
the success of future securities regulation is linked to substantial budgetary
support by Congress. Future factors, such as the strength of the national
economy and the public's attitude toward governmental regulation-; are
obviously relevant to the levels of financial support that the SEC can expect.
Inadequate authorization for appropriation will seriously handicap the
Commission's ongoing efforts to develop and expand computer systems to
receive, process, and disseminate electronic filings and to receive, store, and
analyze data. Some of the information that is generated by SEC computer
systems yields evidence against broker-dealers and their affiliates that appear
to be shielding financial problems and insiders of registered companies and
institutional investors that are suspected of trading abuses.4" SROs also
depend upon soie of the trading information generated by the SEC for their
own market surveillance and, therefore, are impacted by improvement or
deterioration in SEC technology.
Equally important to vigorous SEC enforcement are the recruitment and
retention of a sufficient quantity of talented and dedicated attorneys,
economists, accountants, compliance examiners, computer specialists, and
secretaries. Because of market forces and inferior compensation packages at
the SEC, the Commission's turnover rate for staff attorneys, who handle all
of the agency's litigation, has historically exceeded the turnover rates at other
federal agencies.4' Maintaining the staff is only part of the problem. The
39. See, e.g., Appropriations for 1993, supra note 12, at 590-91.
40. Id. at 653-59 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman). The SEC's Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, which is designed to automate the receipt,
processing, and dissemination of documents filed with the Commission, will cost an estimated $10.3
million for 1993 even though it is not yet fully operational. Id. at 571-75. The development of the large
trader reporting system and the risk assessment system for broker-dealers will require significant
expenditures for both hardware and software. Each system is expected to cost in excess of $1 million
to operate each year. Id. at 653-54.
41. See SECReauthorizationsfor 1992-94, supra note 12, at 53-54. Based on the historical turnover
rate for the SEC, the Commission anticipates that between fiscal years 1991 and 1995 there will be an
85% turnover in all current staff positions and a 90% turnover in attorney positions. Id. at 53 (testimony
of Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman).
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increasing internationalization of the world's securities markets means that the
SEC will require an even larger staff of specialists who are trained in the
complexities of international finance and fraud.
Finally, even if the Commission possesses the technology and personnel to
enforce the federal securities laws, other challenges remain. The international
dimension of the SEC's enforcement program creates issues concerning the
gathering of evidence abroad, service of process through international
conventions and other means, freezing assets overseas, and enforcing
judgments against foreign parties. The Commission has reached temporary
solutions to these problems with some foreign securities regulators.42 A
comprehensive solution, however, must await future negotiation and
discussion among members of the IOSCO Technical Committee, which is
developing enforcement cooperation on a multilateral basis.
II.
Securities regulation, like other areas of law, evolves in anticipation of and
in response to change. The recent, high-speed transformation of national and
international financial markets is strong evidence that dramatic change in
those markets will persist and that securities law will continue to evolve. Part
I identified some of the more recent changes in the world's markets as well
as some of the legal issues that those developments have created for persons
who participate in shaping securities regulation. It is a safe bet that the
securities laws of the future will provide solutions to most of the pressing
legal problems. But the fairness of regulatory solutions, individually and
collectively, will persist as a separate issue. As the following discussion
indicates, an important challenge for those who influence securities law is to
develop better methods for assessing the impact of change, in the marketplace
and in all forms of regulation, on particular aspects of securities regulation
and on securities law as a whole. The scope and importance of this challenge
can be appreciated by examining the theoretical and practical implications of
two regulatory policies that are the foundation of U.S. securities laws: market
efficiency and investor protection.
U.S. securities law is the product of an endless number of compromises
between the private and public interests in the securities markets. The private
interest flows naturally from the basic tenets of our capitalistic society. It
42. As of 1992 the SEC had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with regulators in 15
countries, including Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Richard
M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Internationalization of Securities Fraud Enforcement in the 1990s,
25 REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 119, 127-28 (1992).
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reflects the fundamental belief that individuals or groups of individuals are
entitled to maximum freedom in the ownership and use of their private
property in an economy where market forces and competition are the
predominant limitations. The private interest entitles issuers, intermediaries,
and investors to a regulatory climate where all unnecessary impediments to
efficient markets are eliminated.
The public interest in the securities markets is equally clear. Securities are
an important form of private property, but they also represent an integral
element of the resources of a large segment of this country's population. The
public has a legitimate interest in the long-term financial security of its
important resources. Further, the safety and soundness of the trading markets
have a direct bearing on the flow of new capital into private enterprise and
thus on the country's rate of economic growth. Finally, the securities maikets
can also affect the nation's general economy and well-being, as they did in
1929 and 1987,"3 in ways that Congress described in section 2(4) of the 1934
Act:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden
interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitat-
ed, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreason-
able fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such
exchanges and markets .... 44
For these reasons, Congress determined that the public interest in the
securities markets was sufficiently strong to justify imposing federal restraints
on the private interest in those markets. 45 As a result, securities regulation
has existed at the national level since 1933. The theoretical underpinning of
these laws seems to require that they undergo periodic examination and
assessment to determine whether the private and public interests are receiving
legitimate recognition. In theory, securities law is optimal where at any given
moment a proper balance is struck between the private interest, which stresses
freedom and efficiency, and the public interest, which allows for limitations
and proscriptions.
There is no doubt that securities regulators are sensitive to the conflicts
between the private and public interests in the securities markets. Congressio-
nal committees hold hearings on proposed legislation and elicit testimony and
43. See generally SEC Staff Report, The October 1987 Market Break, Special Report No. 1271,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) cs. 11-12 (Feb. 9, 1988).
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1988) (amended 1990).
45. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuRITIEs MARKETs, H.R. Doc. No. 95,88th Cong., Ist Sess.,
pt. 1, at 9-19 (1963).
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written expressions of opinion on controversial topics. Courts consider the
policy implications of the legal positions advanced in litigation. The SEC as
a matter of course invites the public to submit views and data regarding the
costs and benefits associated with proposed rules or amendments to existing
rules. Each of these efforts at cost-benefit analysis is useful, but none
provides the ongoing and comprehensive monitoring that the theoretical model
demands.
One of the problems with the present system is that securities law addresses
so many technical, interdependent facets of the financial markets and changes
so rapidly that it has become increasingly difficult to articulate the current
state of the law. Without that information, it is impossible to assess the
impact of changes in the marketplace or in particular rules or regulations. The
more serious problem, however, is that the forces in the marketplace that
affect regulation are so numerous, and at times so subtle, that accurate
identification and assessment of relevant changes seem unattainable.
Many changes in the regulatory environment emanate from ordinary events
of the day. Shifts in attitudes toward government, the economy, world politics,
and business in general can and do influence the actions of investors. Other
changes are produced by business firms and promoters seeking new capital
and by market professionals looking for new ways to earn profits. Any
alteration in the mix of securities being offered for sale to the public,
including the issuance of additional securities of the same class as those
outstanding, affects investor choice in obvious ways. However, the impact that
new investment opportunities have on particular groups of investors or
particular markets is less certain. A new issue that succeeds in one market
might be a failure in another market. For instance, investors who are
interested in trading penny stock in the over-the-counter market might be
indifferent to the availability of innovative limited partnership interests in a
local private placement market. Similarly, the introduction of investment
products in one market and the resulting changes that the new products create
in that market might have little, if any, effect on other securities markets. The
issuance of an unusually attractive investment product, for example, could
produce a surge of activity among speculators in the over-the-counter market
or among sophisticated investors in the private placement market accompanied
by fraudulent sales efforts or manipulation of market prices. If these deceptive
practices are widespread, they are certain to threaten the integrity of the over-
the-counter and private placement markets. But these abuses would probably
leave undisturbed the ordinary trading activity on the stock exchanges, in the
bond market, and in the proprietary trading markets of institutions and market
professionals.
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Changes in the marketplace also occur because of limitations imposed by
private persons, such as investors who engage in fraud or pursue meritless
litigation, and by nongovernmental entities, such as stock exchanges, the
NASD, bar associations, and auditing and accounting boards. At the same
time, the marketplace is influenced by decisions rendered by governmental
bodies, such as the SEC, the Federal Reserve and other banking regulators,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the federal and state courts. Private and
public counterparts in foreign countries possess the same ability to influence
behavior and attitudes in their financial and securities markets. Alteration of
the status quo by any of these forces not only affects the way issuers,
intermediaries, and investors perceive investment opportunities and securities
markets, but also changes the entire corpus of the securities law that regulates
these persons.
The cumulative effect of changes in the marketplace and changes in
securities law as a whole is a regulatory environment in flux-one that is
continuously moving closer to or farther away from a balance between
noninterference and restraint. It is for this reason that securities regulators
should regularly monitor and, where appropriate, increase or decrease the
level of regulation. The practical implications of this responsibility can be
appreciated by examining one area of securities law that has undergone
significant change: private rights of action arising from a violation of the
1933 and 1934 Acts.
III.
There is universal agreement that private actions under the federal securities
laws are a necessary supplement to actions brought by the SEC and the
Department of Justice. Limited resources prevent the government from
detecting and prosecuting all violations of the federal securities laws. Private
actions also provide additional deterrence against securities law violations and
permit defrauded investors to seek compensation.46 The overwhelming
majority of private claims under the securities laws allege fraud or violations
of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
Whether functioning as private attorneys general or as injured investors,
private litigants can choose among several remedies. However, remedies under
two provisions stand out. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act4 7 and rule lOb-548
46. See Securities Investors Legal Rights: Hearings on H.R. 3185 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24
(1991) [hereinafter Investors Legal Rights] (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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thereunder represent the core of the federal securities laws that prohibit
deliberate fraud by purchasers or sellers against investors. The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that a private right of action is implied under section
10(b).49 Section 12 of the 1933 Act5 is the only basis for a private action
for rescission or damages against a seller who offered or sold securities in
violation of the registration requirements. It also provides relief against fraud,
but only in connection with the sale of securities." A brief comparison of
these two remedies in their present form with their status in the early 1970s
reveals how extensively one aspect of investor protection has changed,
namely, private enforcement of the securities laws.
A. Rule 10b-5
To succeed under rule 1Ob-5, a claimant must prove that (1) in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, (2) involving the requisite jurisdiction-
al means, (3) the defendant made a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact, (4) with the proper state of mind, (5) upon which the plaintiff
reasonably relied, and (6) which proximately caused the plaintiffs damage. 2
These six elements have not changed during the past twenty years, but judicial
interpretations have altered their meaning. 3 Although the requirement of
reliance is now easier for plaintiffs to satisfy,54 a series of decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court, involving three of the remaining five elements as well
as the limitations period defense, have significantly weakened rule lob-5.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,55 the Supreme Court construed
the so-called Birnbaum rule, which limits rule lOb-5 actions to purchasers or
sellers.5 6 Prior to Blue Chip Stamps, many federal courts interpreted
Birnbaum flexibly and established a number of exceptions and qualifications
to the proposition that a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller. These courts
extended standing to sue to "aborted sellers,' 57 "frustrated sellers,"58 and
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
49. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
50. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1988).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
52. See generally 5 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1B-5 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan Securities Law Series, rev. ed. 1992).
53. Id. § 36.
54. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
55. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
56. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
57. See, e.g., Richardson v. MacArtluir, 451 F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1971).
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other potential investors on a case-by-case basis through particularized judicial
inquiry into the facts surrounding a complaint. In Blue Chip Stamps, a
majority of the Supreme Court announced its support for the "straightforward
application of the Birnbaum rule," 9 thereby narrowing the category of
persons who are eligible to sue under rule lOb-5.6 °
In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.61 and Chiarella v. United States,62 the
Supreme Court tightened the rule even further through interpretations of two
aspects of the requirement that the defendant make a misrepresentation or
omission of material facts. In TSC Industries, the Court was asked to
formulate a test of materiality for purposes of rule 14a-9, 63 a special
antifraud rule for use in connection with the solicitation of proxies. Prior to
this, some federal courts had concluded that a determination of materiality
depended on whether a reasonable shareholder might have been influenced by
a misstatement in a proxy statement or other solicitation material.6 a The
Supreme Court judged this standard to be inconsistent with the disclosure
policy embodied in the proxy regulations.65 In a decision that was applied
immediately by all courts to rule lOb-5 cases, the Court rejected the "might"
formulation, which was too suggestive of mere possibility, in favor of a
tougher "would" standard that contemplates a showing of a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable person would attach importance to an omitted or
misstated fact in determining his or her choice of action in the transaction.66
In Chiarella,67 an insider trading case, the Court addressed the prerequi-
sites of a section 10(b) case that was grounded on nondisclosure of a material
58. See, e.g., Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,591 (N.D. II. 1969).
59. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755.
60. Id. at 747.
61. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
62. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
64. See, e.g., Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, 512 F.2d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
438 (1976); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974).
65. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448-49. The Court stated:
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may
accomplish more harm than good. The potential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can
be great indeed, and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the
corporation and its management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or
misstatements, but also management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may
cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result
that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.
Id,
66. Id. at 449. The Court adopted the TSC Industries standard for purposes of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988).
67. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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fact. The Court was presented with the view, articulated most frequently by
the Second Circuit, that the federal securities laws have "created a system
providing equal access to the information necessary for reasoned and
intelligent investment decisions."6 Under this theory, the use by anyone of
material information not generally available to the public is fraudulent
because the information gives certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage
over less informed buyers and sellers. In a divided opinion, the Court
disagreed and held that "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based on nondisclo-
sure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. '69 According to a
majority of the Court, a duty to disclose material nonpublic information is not
created by an informational advantage, but arises "from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction."70
On still another element of rule lOb-5, the standard of culpability, the
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder7' opted for the narrower
construction. A majority of the Justices refused to follow lower court
decisions announcing that some form of negligence would suffice for civil
liability under rule 1Ob-5, and instead required an allegation of scien-
ter-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.72 Finally, in Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson," the Court, by a vote of five to
four, adopted a uniform limitations period for private actions under section
10(b) that requires defrauded investors to bring actions within one year of
discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, but in no event later than three
years after the fraud occurred. 74 Before Lampf, federal courts tended to
borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations, many of which were
longer than the one-year/three-year structure adopted by the Court, and to
apply the general equitable tolling doctrine, which extended the period of
repose even further. 75 Lampf states explicitly that tolling principles do not
apply to the one-year/three-year rule.76
68. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
69. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
70. Id. at 230.
71. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
72. Id. at 193 & n.12.
73. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
74. Id. at 2782.
75. See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 52, § 235; JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1310-13.
76. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782.
[Vol. 68:791
SECURITIES REGULATION
B. Section 12(1)
Under section 5 of the 1933 Act,77 any person who offers or sells a
security must either file a registration statement with the SEC or qualify for
an exemption. Section 12(l),8 essentially a strict liability provision, braces
this registration requirement by giving purchasers of unregistered, nonexempt
securities an opportunity to rescind a transaction. A purchaser states a prima
facie case under section 12(1) by proving that (1) a registration statement
covering the securities was not in effect, (2) the defendant offered or sold the
securities to the plaintiff, (3) the requisite jurisdictional means were
employed, and (4) the suit was commenced in compliance with the statute of
limitations.7 9 The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the offer
or sale was exempted from section 5.
Two developments in recent years, one judicial and the other administrative,
have weakened this remedy. Until the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter v.
Dahl, most federal courts permitted a section 12(1) plaintiff to seek relief
from the actual owner who passed title of the security to the purchaser or
from a collateral participant in the transaction who was judged to be a
substantial factor in causing the unlawful sale to occur.8 Employing one of
three different tests for expanding the category of seller, courts imposed
section 12(1) liability on a variety of participants in unlawful sales, including:
corporate directors and officers, general partners, attorneys, accountants, and
lending institutions.8 2
In Pinter, the Court found all of these judicial tests for section 12(1) seller
status incompatible with congressional intent. Although the Court rejected a
strict privity approach to the civil liability provision, it decided that section
12(1) liability extends only to the owner of securities and to the person "who
successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to
serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner." 3
Subsequent judicial interpretations of the Pinter test by lower courts indicate
77. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 771(l).
79. See generally 17 J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER
THE 1933 ACT § 5.01 (Clark Boardman Callaghan Securities Law Series, rev. ed. 1992).
80. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
81. 17 HICKS, supra note 79, § 5.04[2][b][ii]; see, e.g., Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.
1980).
82. See generally 17 & 17A HICKS, supra note 79, §§ 5.04[2], 6.03[4].
83. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647.
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that in most instances only the technical owner of a security will qualify as
a section 12(1) seller.84
The adoption of rule 50885 in March, 1989, also weakened section 12(1).
Generally, a seller of unregistered securities could avoid civil liability under
section 12(1) only by proving that it satisfied all of the terms and conditions
of the exemption claimed. Failure to comply with one condition, which might
rank as relatively insignificant in relation to other conditions, would still
result in liability. Rule 508 represents a dramatic change in the law. In
essence, it provides a substantial, good-faith compliance defense against
private actions of rescission under section 12(1) for an issuer relying upon an
exemption under Regulation "D.8 6 Because many offerings of unregistered
securities are made in reliance on Regulation D, the "safe harbor" rule makes
section 12(1) rescission suits more difficult to win.
C. Assessment
The diminished strength of private rights of action under rule lOb-5 or
section 12(1) does not necessarily mean that securities regulators should take
immediate corrective action. As explained earlier, 7 judgments concerning the
fairness of one particular aspect of securities law should not be made in
isolation. What is needed is an assessment of the entire body of securities law,
including the part under consideration and the conditions in the securities
markets, in order to determine whether additional regulation or deregulation
is desirable. Ideally, this assessment should occur continuously, but it is
certainly needed where an unusual event occurs in the marketplace or where
a change in regulatory policy is proposed or likely to happen.
Consider again the scope of private rights of action. Even where the issue
of fairness is precipitated by a single event-such as proposed legislation, a
new administrative rule, or an important judicial decision-the practical
limitations of a comprehensive appraisal are staggering. The present state of
the law under rule lob-5 and section 12(1), even if accurately captured in the
discussion above, is not static. Congress continues to consider bills that would
establish a longer limitation period- for private rights of action under rule 1 Ob-
5,88 which, if enacted, would benefit investors. But Congress is also faced
84. See generally 17A HICKS, supra note 79, at § 6.03[5].
85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1992).
86. See generally 17 HICKS, supra note 79, at § 5.09[2].
87. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
88. See, e.g., H.R. 3185, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Edward Markey of
Massachusetts); S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Sen. Richard Bryan of Nebraska
and four of his colleagues).
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with bills that would introduce proportionate liability in rule lOb-5 suits,
instead of the current joint and several liability, and shift legal fees and
expenses of the winning party to the loser in some suits.89 Both of these
legislative proposals, if enacted, would further diminish the rights of
investors.90
Judicial interpretations of these remedies persist, and the SEC shows no
signs of abandoning its policy of deregulating limited offerings of unregis-
tered securities with a corresponding reduction in the burden of proof for
issuers faced with section 12(1) suits.9 ' Adding to the practical problems of
an assessment is the fact that private rights of action represent only a part of
investor protection, and therefore, must be evaluated in the context of other
regulation, such as the SEC enforcement program, which may or may not
compensate for weaker private remedies. 92 Finally, all of these regulations
89. See H.R. 5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced Aug. 12, 1992, by Rep. Billy Tauzin);
S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced Aug. 11, 1992 by Sen. Peter Domenici).
90. See, for example, Investors Legal Rights, supra note 46, at 118, where Professor Arthur R.
Miller of Harvard University Law School stated that the proposed abrogation of joint and several
liability in securities fraud cases and the adoption of the English rule on attorneys' fees "would
eviscerate all plaintiffs' litigation, the meritorious along with the meritless." Id. (emphasis in original).
He described joint and several liability as essential to deter wrongdoing:
This rule of ancient origin correctly recognizes that a conspiracy cannot be effective
without the participation of each member. If any member blows the whistle, then the
conspiracy falls apart. The perpetration of a complex financial fraud is impossible without
the active assistance of professionals such as investment bankers, lawyers, and
accountants who must be held accountable. Requiring every defendant to pay damages
may be the single most important aspect of the current liability system that Congress
needs to preserve in order to deter the future Milkins, Boeskys, and Keatings from
perpetrating their frauds.
Id. at 119.
Professor Miller explained his opinion that no one, no matter how strong his or her claim appeared,
would assume the risk of pursuing a private claim against wealthy defendants under a rule that imposed
all legal costs on the loser
Litigation success is never certain. In the securities context, if there is even a remote
possibility that a class plaintiff would have to pay the legal fees of the defendants, it
would be a major deterrent to anyone seeking to remedy a justiciable wrong. Illustrative-
ly, I am informed that Drexel was prepared to spend $1 billion in its defense and that it
was paying Milken's lawyers over $2 million per month at the height of the government's
enforcement activities. Who would risk paying the staggering legal fees of these
wrongdoers if there was a chance the defendants would defeat a civil suit-perhaps on
a technical defense such as the statute of limitations-leaving the "losef' responsible for
the fees?
Id. at 118-19.
91. See, e.g., Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, at 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,439 (July 30, 1992); Additional Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-
6950 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,025 (July 30, 1992).
92. The SEC's enforcement powers were augmented in October, 1990, by two laws that are among
the most significant changes in the securities laws in decades: the Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), and the
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must be integrated with the remaining components of securities regulation,
such as registration and reporting obligations under the 1934 Act, for an even
broader assessment of investor protection.
Equally important to a judgment regarding the proper scope of rule 1Ob-5
and section 12(1) is an examination of the marketplace to determine the
pressures that it is placing on the participants in the securities markets as well
as the pressures that it is experiencing from all forms of regulation. A general
overview of the marketplace in its present state has already been provided.93
More specific market information is required to respond to the issue
prompting the assessment. For example, it would seem that the weakening of
private rights of action under rule lOb-5 and section 12(1) has had an impact
in the markets that is difficult to measure but nonetheless relevant. Less
effective private actions reduce the level of deterrence against fraud and
registration violations, thereby making investments more hazardous and less
attractive to investors. At some point, less deterrence will result in less
participation in U.S. securities markets and a higher cost of capital for
business. Data on the strength or weakness of the private placement market
are needed since section 12(1) is especially valuable to investors in primary
issues of unregistered securities. Also relevant would be information about the
incidence and complexity of securities fraud94 and the average period of time
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931
(1990) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Market Reform Act provided the SEC with
powers to monitor and stabilize the national securities markets, including the authority to suspend
trading during a market emergency, to restrict trading practices in equity securities during periods of
extraordinary market volatility, to preempt state laws governing the transfer and pledge of securities
during periods of extraordinary market volatility, to preempt state laws governing the transfer and pledge
of securities where necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the national clearance and settlement
system, and to coordinate initiatives with other federal regulatory agencies. The Remedies Act greatly
expands the SEC's enforcement capabilities by authorizing monetary penalties in both civil and
administrative proceedings. It also authorizes the Commission to institute administrative proceedings to
obtain cease-and-desist orders against, and impose disgorgement on, any person for violations of the
federal securities laws.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
94. Many securities regulators believe that fraud in the financial and investment markets has reached
dramatic proportions and that prosecutorial and regulatory resources remain severely limited. See, e.g.,
Investors Legal Rights, supra note 46, at 64, 68 (statement of Mark J. Griffin on behalf of NASAA).
Investors have brought private actions under rule lOb-5 in the past few decades in the most flagrant
cases of abusive conduct in the markets, including insider trading and market manipulation (e.g., Ivan
Boesky, Michael Milken), mutual fund fraud (e.g., Robert Vesco, Bernard Comfeld), bank and savings
and loan fraud (e.g., American Continental Corporation/Lincoln Savings, Centrust Savings and Loan,
Penn Square Bank), government securities fraud (e.g., -Drysdale Securities, ESM), and financial
statement fraud (e.g., ZZZZ Best, Penn Central Corporation, Baldwin-United, Equity Funding). Id. at
19 (testimony of Richard C' Breeden, Chairman of SEC).
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that it remains concealed from government regulators and investors."
Finally, an evaluation of the marketplace would not be complete without an
opinion on the level and costs of all regulation in the financial markets.
Evidence of deregulation in the financial services industry during the past
twenty years, of the type described earlier,96 and other manifestations of
laissez-faire in the SEC and the courts during this period of time would be
useful for such an evaluation.
The daunting task of gathering information on the state of securities law and
of the marketplace does not get easier at the final stage. Assuming that a
securities regulator succeeded in reaching this stage of analysis, armed with
relevant data and well-founded preliminary opinions with respect to a
proposed change in a private right of action, it must still determine whether
acting on the proposal would be beneficial to all of the participants in the
capital markets. What is beneficial depends on the status of the regulatory
environment in relationship to the optimal balance between free enterprise and
restraint.
CONCLUSION
In the four decades following the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
U.S. securities regulators operated within a legal structure that restricted
competition among participants in the financial services industry. The legal
problems that they addressed were predominantly domestic in scope. During
the past twenty years, both of these characteristics of federal securities
regulation have changed. These years have been marked by extraordinary
developments in the financial services industry and in all segments of the
securities business. With these changes have come phenomenal growth in the
complexity, volume, and availability of financial and ifivestment instruments
and a transformation of U.S. securities law from national to transnational
95. SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden offered the following comments:
Securities fraud entails a much greater potential for concealment or deception than
the typical consumer fraud. Unlike the purchaser of a used car, who can take it for a test
drive, or give it to a mechanic of his own choice for inspection, a purchaser of a security
is often not in a position to detect financial fraud. Moreover, product defects typically
manifest themselves within a short time. The consequences of financial fraud and
misrepresentations, in contrast, may not become apparent for years. For example,
fraudulent tax-shelters are seldom discovered until years later when the IRS disallows the
tax deduction, or the projected long-term profit does not materialize.
Id. at 25. Mark J. Griffin, deputy secretary, Securities Division, State of Nevada, on behalf of NASAA,
testified that in his experience most elaborate schemes are not discovered until seven years after they
originate. Id. at 180.
96. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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regulation. These trends show no sign of abating in the decades ahead.
Consequently, it is imperative for U.S. securities regulators to develop and
implement reforms to modernize the financial services regulatory system; to
develop appropriate domestic and international standards concerning
disclosure requirements, accounting and auditing practices, broker-dealer
capital adequacy rules, transparency, clearance and settlement systems, and
insider trading; and to structure an enforcement program that remains
effective in the evolving world markets.
Equally important, regulators must evaluate securities law in the context of
international regulation in order to ensure that restraints on issuers, market
intermediaries, and investors do not unfairly impede competition and
efficiency in the capital markets. Achieving this objective in connection with
particular legal issues, such as the scope of private rights of action, will never
come easily given the many practical problems of gathering relevant data and
of balancing competing interests. But the theoretical model for achieving fair
regulation encompasses any legal issue regardless of the practical difficulties
or the size of the marketplace. The challenge is to develop the capabilities for
applying it effectively in a regulatory environment that is increasingly global.
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